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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper considers the allocation of indivisible durable goods through decentralized trading
processes. A simple example is the allocation of N oﬃces among N students. Even if the size of
the problem, N, is relatively small, the number of possible allocations can be quite large. With ten
students and oﬃces, the number of allocations is about 3.6 million. When there are other goods
to be allocated besides oﬃces (such as parking permits), the problem of ﬁnding eﬃcient allocations
becomes even more complex. We examine how successful decentralized trading processes are in
solving those complex combinatorial problems.
We consider a situation where agents randomly meet over time. When a group of agents
meet, they exchange their goods in the following simple way. First, a new allocation for them is
randomly proposed, and it is accepted if it provides a higher utility for all of them. Otherwise, the
agents continue to hold their endowments. When they assess the proposed allocation, we assume
that their utility is subject to random shocks. These shocks can be interpreted as mistakes, or
temporal changes in tastes. Alternatively, the shocks may represent speculation based on “animal
spirits” (that is, an agent may accept a bad bundle of goods for him, in the hope that it will be
exchanged for a better bundle in the future; our “animal spirits” interpretation is that agents do
not always hold rational expectations about the future course of exchange).
Incorporating random terms in utility function has been found to be quite useful in econometric
studies of discrete choice problems (such as the choice of occupation or means of transportation),
and we employ one of the leading speciﬁcations in econometrics, the logit model, for the distrib-
ution of the noise term. Owing to the special structure of the model, we obtain the closed form
solution of the stationary distribution, for any level of noise. T h i si si nc o n t r a s tt ot h et r a d i -
tional stochastic stability methodology, ﬁrst introduced to economics and game theory in Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993a). The method identiﬁes those states —allocations— in
which the economy spends most of its time in the long run, when the noise in the system is made
negligible. Negligible noise implies a fairly long waiting time to see the long run eﬀects, and this
casts doubt on the relevance of the model. The present paper, in contrast, allows us to analyze
the case where the noise level is reasonably large, so that the stationary distribution provides
useful predictions over an economically relevantt i m eh o r i z o n . I tt u r n so u tt h a ti no u rm o d e l ,t h e
selected state under vanishing noise remains the most likely state in the stationary distribution,
for any level of noise. Speciﬁcally, we show that, for any level of noise, the state that maximizes
a well known social welfare function receives the largest probability in the stationary distribution
(and, as the randomness vanishes, the stationary distribution assigns probability one to such a
state). We explore diﬀerent variants of the model. For example, when the noise is additive, we
ﬁnd that the most likely state maximizes Bentham’s utilitarian social welfare (the sum of utilities).
Also, when the noise is multiplicative, the state v i s i t e dm o s to ft h et i m ei st h eo n et h a tm a x i m i z e s
Nash’s social welfare (the product of utilities). If the trading process is implemented by (very)
risk-averse representatives, the most likely state maximizes Rawls’ egalitarian social welfare func-
tion (the minimum of utilities). All these results are a consequence of a single technical argument,
relating stochastic stability with a strong form of utilitarianism.
Note that the above results imply that the most likely state is eﬃcient. This conclusion
may seem straightforward because (when the randomness is negligible) agents agree to trade
only if their payoﬀs increase, so that the social welfare should (mostly) be monotone increasing.
1The important point to note, however, is that with no noise the process may be stuck on an
ineﬃcient state. For example, this will happen when only bilateral trades are possible once the
economy reaches an ineﬃcient state where there is no double coincidence of wants.1 In this respect,
decentralized trading processes for indivisible goods resemble the algorithms that are used to solve
combinatorial optimization problems with multip l el o c a lm a x i m a ,w h e r et h ep r o c e s sm a yg e ts t u c k
in one of them. For this, it has been found that random search algorithms, notably the ones based
on simulated annealing methods (see Aarts and Korst (1989)) are quite eﬀective. Since stochastic
evolutionary game theory is based on the same basic idea as simulated annealing, its application
to the allocation of indivisible goods should be particularly fruitful. Just like randomness in
simulated annealing helps to escape from a local maximum, so does randomness in utility ensure
that our trading process is not stuck at an ineﬃcient state.
The above results are obtained for barter processes, but we also study exchange of goods with
monetary transfers. It turns out that our assumption on the noise term and the quasi-linearity of
utility in money allows us to extend the same techniques to this case, thereby yielding a similar
result. This may be of independent interest: despite money being a continuous variable in the
model, we are able to use the methods and framework developed mostly for discrete variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes three models of barter processes, and
Section 3 introduces money. The ﬁnal section discusses related literature.
2 Decentralized Barter: Exchange Economies
There are K durable and indivisible commodities in the economy. The set of agents is N =
{1,...,I}.A g e n t i’s consumption set is Zi ⊂ {0,1,2,...}
K. This allows for the possibility that
an agent consumes an arbitrary number of units of each good, as in general exchange economies,
or only one unit of one of the goods and zero of the others, as in house allocation problems.
At time t ∈ {1,2,...,} agent i holds a bundle of commodities denoted by zi(t). Although the
individuals’ holdings may change over time, the aggregate endowment of goods remains ﬁxed, i.e. P
i∈N zi(t)=z. A coalition is a non-empty subset of agents. For any coalition S ⊂ N,af e a s i b l e
allocation for S at time t, denoted by zS ∈ ×i∈SZi is a distribution of their endowments at t.
The set of feasible allocations for S at t is
AS(zS(t)) = {z0








The set of feasible allocations in the economy is given by





There is an exogenously given set of feasible coalitions, denoted S ⊂ 2N that may meet and
trade in each period. For example, when only pairwi s em e e t i n g sa r ep o s s i b l e( ap a r t i c u l a rc a s eo f
1Section 2.2 provides a simple example to illustrate this point. Ben-Shoham, Serrano, and Volij (2004) showed
that an ineﬃcient state can be stochastically stable, when all mistakes are equally likely. Hence, adding noise does
n o ta l w a y sh e l pt oe s c a p ef r o ma ni n e ﬃcient state. Our model provides a set of suﬃcient conditions for the noise
term to knock out ineﬃcient states.
2our model), we have S = {S ⊂ N ||S| =2 }. W ea s s u m et h a tf r o ma n yi n i t i a lf e a s i b l ea l l o c a t i o nz,
any feasible allocation z0 can be reached through a series of reallocations by a sequence of coalitions
S1,...,ST ∈ S.A t p e r i o d t =1 ,2,... a coalition S ∈ S is selected with probability q(S) > 0
(independently over time), and has the opportunity to reallocate their holdings of commodities.
2.1 Barter with Additive Random Utility
We introduce persistent random shocks by assuming that agent i’s utility is given by
vi(zi)=ui(zi)+ηi(zi), (1)
where ui(zi) and ηi(zi) stand for the intrinsic utility derived from bundle zi and noise, respectively.
The noise term is independently distributed over time and across agents.
Suppose that, in the current period, a coalition S ∈ S is selected, and let zS ≡ zS(t) be the
allocation of goods for this coalition at the beginning of the current period. A new allocation
for this coalition is determined as follows. There is a ﬁxed probability distribution, which we
call the proposal distribution, over the set of new feasible allocations AS(zS(t)). We assume
that this distribution is uniform: a new allocation z0
S ∈ AS(zS(t)) is proposed with probability
1/|AS(zS(t))|. When coalition S meets and is considering a proposal z0
S, alternative to the current
zS, we assume that the new allocation is implemented if and only if ∀i ∈ S, vi(z0
i) ≥ vi(zi),w i t ha
strict inequality at least for one agent.
Therefore, if we let Fi be the distribution of the noise term ηi(zi) for all zi, for any two bundles zi
and z0
i, the probability that agent i agrees to get z0
i in exchange for zi is given by
Pr(vi(z0
i) >v i(zi)) = Pr(ui(z0






i) − ui(zi)+x)dFi(x). (3)
Assume further that the noise term ηi(zi) in (1) has the type I extreme value distribution (or
Gumbel distribution) with precision parameter βi > 0, whose cumulative distribution function Fi
is given by
Fi(x)=e x p ( −exp(−βix − γ)), (4)
where γ is a constant to make the mean equal to zero. Then it is known that
Pr(vi(z0






From this formula it can be seen that, as βi →∞ , noise vanishes and the agent maximizes ui










This is what is known in econometrics as the logit model. As is clear from the ﬁr s te q u a l i t yi n( 2 ) ,
what matters for the calculation of the probability that agent i accepts to trade is the distribution
of t = ηi(zi)−ηi(z0
i). Under our assumption on Fi, this distribution is given by Gi(t)=1 /(1+e−βit),
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Figure 1.
As we can see, the density is quite similar to the normal density, but it has fatter tails.2 Although
the normal noise has better “microfoundations” (as the sum of independent shocks), it does not
allow a clean analytical solution. Instead, we use the logit model, which is similar to the normal
one, but which does provide a nice closed form solution. Later, in Section 2.2, we conduct numerical
simulations with normal noise to show that the behavior of both models is quite similar to each
other.
The above description deﬁnes a Markov process on the set of feasible allocations of the economy.
At every period, the economy can transit from one allocation to another and, since we assumed
that the set of feasible coalitions is such that it is a l w a y sp o s s i b l et og of r o ma n yf e a s i b l ea l l o c a t i o n
to any other through a ﬁnite sequence of reallocations, the resulting Markov process is irreducible.
Moreover, there is a chance that the state does not change, which indicates that the process is
aperiodic. For such a process, there is a unique stationary distribution with the following two
properties. First, starting from any initial allocation, the probability distribution on period t
allocations is known to approach that stationary distribution (as t →∞ ). Second, the stationary
distribution also represents the proportion of time spent on each state over an inﬁnite time horizon.












Before we present the proof, a few remarks are in order. First, the denominator is a normalizing
constant, common to all z, to ensure that
P
z∈Z µ(z)=1 . Therefore only the numerator contains
relevant information. The formula tells us that the stationary distribution is “exponentially
2The tail of the normal density decays at the rate of e
−ct2
,w h i l et h ed e n s i t ygi(t) for the logit case approximately
decays at the rate of e
−c0t for large t (see the expression for gi(t): the constant c
0 is equal to the precision parameter
βi.). As t →∞ , the former converges to zero faster than the latter. (Of course, c =1 /2σ
2,w h e r eσ
2 is the








i. We will conduct such comparisons in Section 2.2.)
4proportional” to the social welfare function
P
i∈N βiui(zi). In particular, the most likely state
(for any level of noise) is the one that maximizes that social welfare. Second, recall that βi is
the precision parameter of agent i’s noise term, meaning that a larger βi implies a smaller level of
noise. The formula is easiest to understand when we regard the noise term as the representation of
mistakes. Suppose two players have identical utility functions but diﬀerent precision paramenters.
Then, the agent who makes fewer mistakes (i.e., who had the higher βi) receives a higher utility
in the long run. Third, the stationary distribution is independent of the matching probabilities,
represented by q(s). Suppose that we have two players with identical utility functions and
precision parameters, and assume that one has more opportunities to trade than the other. One
may expect that the one with more opportunities to trade does better than the other, but in the
long run they receive the same payoﬀ distribution.
Proof. Let Pr(z,z0) be the transition probability from state z to z0. It is enough to show
that
µ(z)Pr(z,z0)=µ(z0)Pr(z0,z) ∀z,z0 ∈ Z. (6)




µ(z0)Pr(z0,z) ∀z ∈ Z,
which means that µ is an invariant distribution. Equation (6), a suﬃcient condition for stationary
distribution, is known as the detailed balance condition, and it states that the probability inﬂows
and outﬂows are balanced for any pair of states. To show that the detailed balance condition
















Let S0 ≡ {i ∈ N |z0
i 6= zi} be the set of agents whose bundles change, and let S0 ≡ {S ∈ S|S0 ⊂ S}
be the set of feasible coalitions containing S0. The new allocation z0 is obtained from z only if a
coalition in S0 is selected. If S0 is empty, we have Pr(z,z0)=P r ( z0,z)=0so that the condition

















i)]+exp[βiui(zi)]}.N o t e t h a t q(S) is the probability that coalition S,
which contains S0 ≡ {i ∈ N |z0
i 6= zi}, is selected, and with probability 1
|AS(zS)| the new allocation
z0
S is proposed (recall our uniform proposal assumption). The third factor is, by (5), the probability
that the agents who are proposed a new allocation (i.e., agents in S0 ≡ {i ∈ N |z0















3Agents in S \ S
0
are proposed the same bundles as before, so they are indiﬀerent between z
0
S and zS.
5Hence, if we denote U(z) ≡
P














































=e x p U(z0)Pr(z0,z),
w h e r ew eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tAS(zS)=AS(z0





i. Hence condition (7)
is satisﬁed
Note that the detailed balance equation (6) fails when the proposal distribution is not uniform
over the allocations other than the current one. Without the uniform assumption, the clean closed
form solution cannot be obtained. On the other hand, in house allocation problems, where each
agent occupies one house, this assumption is automatically satisﬁed when only pairwise meetings
are possible. This is because the only feasible new allocation for a pair is obtained by just
exchanging their houses.
Thus, Proposition 1 allows one to obtain the exact proportion of time that the system would
spend at each feasible allocation in the long run. Let us now examine how the stationary
distribution changes with the level of noise. For simplicity, consider the symmetric case with
β1 = ···= βI = β. When the precision parameter of the noise terms β is close to 0, the system
is subject to large random shocks, and the expression in Proposition 1 shows that the stationary
distribution is close to the uniform distribution. As the level of noise decreases (i.e., as β in-
creases), states with higher social welfare
P
i∈N ui(zi) receive higher probabilities. When noise
is vanishing (β →∞ ), each term expβ
P
i∈N ui(zi), z ∈ Z diverges to inﬁnity, but the one that
corresponds to the maximizer of the social welfare
P
i∈N ui(zi) does so with the highest speed.
Hence we have the following sharp characterizations.
Corollary 2 In the barter model with additive random utility, if the noise is symmetric (β1 =
···= βI = β)a n dβ →∞ , the stationary distribution places probability 1 on the allocation(s) that
maximizes the Bentham utilitarian social welfare function
P
i∈N ui(zi).
Corollary 3 In the barter model with additive random utility, if the noise parameter is βi = λiβ
for all i ∈ N and β →∞ , the stationary distribution places probability 1 on the allocation(s) that




The stationary distribution we have obtained summarizes the behavior of the system over a long
horizon. To investigate the behavior of the sample paths in more detail, we conduct some
numerical simulations. We also examine if the normal noise case, which does not admit an
analytical solution, behaves in a similar way to our logit model.
6Suppose that we have 30 students and 30 parking permits. The parking permits come in three
varieties. There are 10 type a permits, which allow one to park in area a. Similarly, we have 10
type b and 10 type c permits. There are also three types of students, with the following utility
functions:
Type A : uA(a)=2 , uA(b)=1 , uA(c)=0
Type B : uB(b)=2 , uA(c)=1 , uA(a)=0
Type C : uA(c)=2 , uA(a)=1 , uA(b)=0
That is, the most convenient parking areas for type A, B,a n dC,a r ea, b,a n dc respectively.






This means that, out of the 10 type A players, ﬁve have permits b and the other ﬁve have permits
c. We assume pairwise meetings, so that one pair of students is randomly selected in each period
and, if they agree, they exchange their permits. We ﬁrst assume that each agent’s noise term has
type I extreme value distribution (the logit model) with the same precision parameter β.F i g u r e
2 plots a typical sample path for our model. To summarize the data in one ﬁgure, we plot the
t o t a ls o c i a lw e l f a r e
P































Note that the maximum social welfare
P
i∈N ui(zi) is 60 (each of the 30 students receives maximum
payoﬀ 2). The ﬁgure shows that the process without noise can be stuck in an ineﬃcient state.
7This occurs when each student ends up having his second best permit, so that there is no double
coincidence of wants. For example, assume that type A students have permit b and type B
students have permit c. When they meet, B students would like to obtain their best permit b,
while c is the worst one for A students. Hence (without noise) they do not agree to trade.
When the level of noise is large (β =0 .1), the process is volatile and the sum of intrinsic
utilities is generally low. However, for lower randomness (β =1 ), the social welfare increases,
and when the level of noise is reasonably small (β =3 ), the process reaches the maximum social
welfare and stays there for a long time. The variance of the noise term ηi(zi) in this case is π2
6β2 ≈
0.18. If we assume that three pairs meet per day, the ﬁgure shows that the maximum social
welfare is achieved within three years.4
We now present a typical simulation result with normally distributed noise terms (Figure 3).
The path for β =1in the ﬁgure, for example, is associated with the normal noise which has the































We can see that the behavior of the paths are similar to that of the logit model, although
convergence to the maximum social welfare is slower in the case where β =3 . This may be due
t ot h ef a c tt h a tt h et y p eIe x t r e m ev a l u ed i s t r i b u t ion has fatter tails than the normal distribution,
so that a large disturbance, which helps to leave an ineﬃcient state, is less likely to occur under
the normal distribution.
4The term “social welfare” should be interpreted carefully. If the noise term represents mistakes and animal spirit
speculation (see introduction), then the interpretation is straightforward. In contrast, if the noise term represents
payoﬀ shocks, the realized payoﬀs (cum noise) is the relevant measure of social welfare. In that case, we cannot
readily say that the path for β =0 .1 is worse than the path without noise. However, this is not a problem when we
compare the path without noise with the path for β =3 . Note that those paths are mostly constant and that the
latter dominates the former. Because the i.i.d. noise term has mean 0, the (time) average of realized social welfare
(cum noise) should be higher on the latter path.
82.3 Barter with Multiplicative Random Utility
Now assume that the noise term in the utility function has a multiplicative form
vi(zi)=ui(zi)ξi(zi), (8)
where ηi(zi) ≡ logξi(zi) has an extreme value distribution with parameter βi,w h o s ec u m u l a t i v e
distribution function is given by (4). Then we have
logvi(zi)=l o gui(zi)+ηi(zi),
and exactly the same analysis as above applies, where ui(zi) is now replaced with logui(zi).H e n c e
we have the following:










Using this closed form solution of the stationary distribution, one can obtain the following
limiting results:
Corollary 5 In the barter model with multiplicative random utility, if the noise is symmetric
(β1 = ···= βI = β)a n dβ →∞ , the stationary distribution places probability 1 on the allocations
that maximize the Nash social welfare function
Q
i∈N ui(zi).
Corollary 6 In the barter model with multiplicative random utility, if the noise parameter is
βi = λiβ for all i ∈ N and β →∞ , the stationary distribution places probability 1 on the
allocation that maximize the weighted Nash social welfare function
Q
i∈N ui(zi)λi.
For the Nash social welfare function, the reader is referred, for example, to Kaneko (1980). As
for its weighted version, other names that have been used to describe this function are “generalized
Nash solution” (Harsanyi and Selten (1972), p. 101) or “asymmetric Nash solution” (Kalai (1977)).
(Roth ((1979), pp.15-16) provides a good exposition.)
T h eu t i l i t yi nt h em u l t i p l i c a t i v ec a s ei st h el o g of the utility in the additive case. One could
argue that they both represent the same underlying (random) preference relations. The separate
treatment of those two cases is justiﬁed when one admits that the utility has some cardinal
meaning. For example, if we postulate that the intrinsic utility function ui is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, the multiplicative case is diﬀerent from the additive case, because
they represent diﬀerent attitudes toward risk.
As an illustration of the economic relevance of both models, suppose a planner knows that
half of the agents in a population are risk neutral (say, agents of type 2), while half have a square
root utility (type 1) over some discrete units of money. In fact, to simplify let us suppose there
are only two individuals who keep bumping into each other and reallocating a discrete surplus of
size 1. In these meetings, accepting a reallocation of the pie is driven by the noise, which makes
each bargainer “soft” and inclined to accept sometimes reductions of his share. The planner
9k n o w st h a tt h ei n t r i n s i cu t i l i t i e sa r ea s described, but is not sure which speciﬁcation of logit noise
accompanies intrinsic utility. At the same time, she knows that agents really are maximizing their
intrinsic utility aﬀected by noise. If noise is additive, the system will gravitate most of the time
around the (1/4, 3/4) split of the discrete pie when mistakes are very unlikely, or around this and
nearby splits that are in the direction of maximizing the sum of intrinsic utilities when noise is
sizable (this split corresponds to the Bentham optimum). In contrast, if noise is multiplicative, it
will tend to be around (1/3, 2/3) most of the time (the Nash optimum). That is, the additive noise
speciﬁcation punishes the risk averse agent more than does the multiplicative noise speciﬁcation.
Young (1993b) obtains asymmetric Nash solutions as the limits of an evolutionary process in
which pairs of agents play the Nash demand game. The process is one of perturbed best-response
dynamics to a sample of past history. There are two populations of agents from which a pair of
bargainers is drawn every period, and as a function of the sample size of each group, the system
selects the corresponding asymmetric Nash solution, where the weights are given by the relative
sample sizes.
2.4 A Model of Representation
We turn now to a conceptual variant of the model presented above. Suppose there is a set
N = {1,2,...,I} of social groups. Group i ∈ N has a (non-random) quasi-linear utility function
ui(zi)+ti,w h e r eti represents the amount of money, and zi is the allocation of durable goods for
group i. The group utility function ui(zi) admits a couple of interpretations. We could interpret
ui as the utility of the “representative” agent in group i. For more precise formulation, let i1,. . . ,
iM be the agents in group i , and assume that each agent im has a quasi-linear utility wim(·)+tim.
When zi represents (local) public goods, the group utility function is given by ui(zi)=
P
m wim(zi).




m zim = zi.( H e r e w e
assume that the agents in the group optimally allocate zi among themselves (without mistakes).)
In any case, note that ui(zi) represents the dollar value of group i’s possessions zi.E a c h g r o u p
hires a representative who is responsible for trading goods with the representatives of the other
groups. In particular, when the representative of group i obtains a bundle of goods zi, he receives
a share of the dollar-value of the bundle, θui(zi). For ease of analysis, we normalize the parameters
so that θ =1 . We assume that the representative of group i has a constant relative risk aversion
utility function so that his intrinsic utility is given by
ui(zi)1−ρi
1−ρi ,w h e r eρi ≥ 0 is his rate of relative





where ηi has an extreme value distribution with precision parameter β. With the same proof as
the ﬁrst proposition, one can establish the following result:











10Now, taking the limit as β →∞ , we obtain another utilitarian selection because the process
ends up assigning all probability to the allocations that maximize the sum of the utilities of the
representatives. In particular,
Corollary 8 In the barter model with representation, if the relative risk aversion of each repre-
sentative is the same (ρi = ρ for every representative i), as β →∞ , the stationary distribution
places probability 1 on the allocations that maximize the “constant elasticity of substitution” social
welfare function
P
i∈N ui(zi)1−ρ/(1 − ρ). Moreover, there is ρ such that if ρ > ρ,a sβ →∞ ,t h e
stationary distribution places probability 1 on the allocations that maximize the “Rawlsian” social
welfare function mini∈N{ui(zi)}.
According to this result, the more risk averse the group representatives are, the more egalitarian-
like the social outcome is. That is, if ρ =0 , which corresponds to representatives’ risk neutrality,
the outcome will be the maximizer of the utilitarian social welfare. However, as ρ →∞ ,t h e
allocations selected with probability 1 are those for which the egalitarian Leontieﬀ (or Rawlsian)
social welfare function mini∈N{ui(zi)} is maximized. (Our claim that this happens for a ﬁnite
(but large) ρ follows from the ﬁniteness of feasible allocations: when
P
i∈N ui(zi)1−ρ/(1 − ρ) is
suﬃciently close to its limit mini∈N{ui(zi)}, they are maximized at the same point, because the
domain of those functions is ﬁnite.) This may raise an intriguing conjecture for political theory:
are egalitarian policies driven by risk averse politicians?
3 Trade with Money: House Allocation Problems with Side Pay-
ments
We now consider the case where indivisible goods are traded with (divisible) money. While the
barter model of the previous section may be a good approximation of the oﬃce allocation in a
department where no monetary transfers are associated with the oﬃce assignment, to describe a
housing market it is realistic to introduce monetary transfers.
More speciﬁcally, we consider an economy with a set H of houses, and a set N of agents. The
number of houses and the number of agents are the same: |H| = |N|. An agent’s consumption
bundle consists of only one house and money. Therefore, a house allocation is an assignment
(zi)i∈N of the houses in H to the agents in N. A typical allocation is an object of the form
((zi,m i))i∈N such that (zi)i∈N is a house allocation, and for each i ∈ N, mi denotes agent i’s
money holdings, which for simplicity are allowed to be negative.
Each agent i ∈ N is assumed to have quasi-linear utility:
πi(zi,m i) ≡ vi(zi)+mi = ui(zi)+ηi(zi)+mi. (10)
As before, ηi(zi) is the random component of utility and it is distributed according to the type I
extreme value distribution with precision parameter βi. H e r ew ea s s u m et h a tt h ea g e n t sh a v et h e
same parameter: βi = β for all i ∈ N. This turns out to be essential for the present analysis.
For now we only consider bilateral meetings in which a pair of agents (i,j) is selected with
probability q(i,j) > 0 in each period. At the end of the section we shall discuss the extension
of our analysis to general exchange economies with money and to a trading process involving
11coalitions other than pairs of agents. We consider the following bargaining procedure. Suppose
agents i and j meet, with the current endowments zi and zj.L e tp ∈ < be a monetary transfer
from i to j,w h e r ei<j . In other words, we follow a convention that p denotes the payment
made by the agent with a lower index, and note that this is without loss of generality, as p can
be negative. We suppose that the matched pair ﬁrst come up with p randomly, and then choose
to trade at that price if this is mutually beneﬁcial (according to their utilities with realized noise
term). More speciﬁcally, let fij(p) be the density of p for pair (i,j). Its support may be a ﬁnite
interval which may vary across diﬀe r e n tp a i r s . W ea s s u m et h a tt h i s distribution is symmetric:
fij(p)=fij(−p).When i and j meet, ﬁrst p is realized according to fij(p), and then they exchange
their current holdings at price p i fa n do n l yi f
ui(zj)+ηi(zj) − p>u i(zi)+ηi(zi),a n d ( 1 1 )
uj(zi)+ηj(zi)+p>u j(zj)+ηj(zj).( 1 2 )
Then, as the random utility shocks ηi(·) and ηj(·) have an extreme value distribution, condition
(11) holds with probability
exp(β(ui(zj) − p))
exp(β(ui(zj) − p)) + exp(βui(zi))
.









H(p)=[ e x p ( β(ui(zj) − p)) + exp(β(ui(zi))][exp(β(uj(zi)+p)) + exp(β(uj(zj))]
=e x p ( β(ui(zj)+uj(zi))) + exp(β(ui(zj)+uj(zj) − p)
+exp(β(ui(zi)+uj(zi)+p)+e x p ( β(ui(zi)+uj(zj))). (14)
Note that the equality of noise parameters βi = β for all i ∈ N is essential to eliminate p from the
numerator of (13). After trade takes place, i possesses zj and j possesses zi and the monetary
transfer p takes place from i to j. When these agents meet again, the probability of trade
(to restore the original endowments) given −p is obtained by exchanging zi and zj in the above




where the denominator is obtained by exchanging zi and zj in the last equality of (14). This fact
is crucial for obtaining the stationary distribution in a closed form.
Note also that we have the following property:
12Lemma 9 The house allocation z(t) follows a Markov chain.
This means that, despite the presence of the divisible commodity “money,” we can restrict our
attention to the allocation of houses, whose evolution can be described as a Markov chain on a
ﬁnite state space. Intuitively, this is implied by the absence of income eﬀects of the quasi-linear
utility: the preferences over goods, and therefore the law of motion, are not aﬀected by how much
income each agent possesses. Let us now denote the Markov chain’s stationary distribution by
µz.
Just like in the barter model with additive random utility, we have the following result.
Proposition 10 In the house allocation problem with money, the stationary distribution for the
















Proof. Let Pr(z,z0) be the transition probability from state z to z0. Again we will show the
detailed balance condition:
µz(z)Pr(z,z0)=µz(z0)Pr(z0,z). (16)
(Recall that summing both sides over z0 shows that µz is the stationary distribution). To show

















If z0 cannot be obtained by a pairwise trade from z, then (17) is satisﬁed because Pr(z,z0)=
Pr(z0,z)=0 . Otherwise, z0 is obtained from z when a pair of agents trade, in which case let us
denote the pair by (i,j),w h e r ei<j . Hence, we have
z0
k = zk for k 6= i,j and
z0
i = zj and z0










where H(p) is given by (14). Recall that q(i,j) is the probability that the pair (i,j) meets,
that given p the exchange occurs with probability in the square bracket (see (13)), and that p is
proposed according to density fij.








































Therefore, one obtains the same limiting results as in Corollaries 1 and 2 as β →∞ :
Corollary 11 In the house allocation model with money, if the noise is symmetric β1 = ··· =
βI = β and β →∞ , the stationary distribution places probability 1 on the goods allocation(s) that
maximizes the Bentham utilitarian social welfare function
P
i∈N ui(zi).
Corollary 12 In the house allocation model with money, if the noise parameter is βi = λiβ for
all i ∈ N and β →∞ , the stationary distribution places probability 1 on the allocation(s) that
maximizes the corresponding weighted utilitarian social welfare function
P
i∈N λiui(zi).
The following remarks are in order:
Remark 1: The results can be extended to an exchange economy in which there are K indivisible
goods (apart from money) and where an agent can hold any subset of the indivisible goods. To
do this, as in Section 2, one needs to assume that the proposal distribution in each meeting is
uniform.
Remark 2: The results can also be extended to a process in which coalitions, not only pairs,
trade. To do this, the bargaining procedure played by coalition S begins with the draw of transfers
p =( pi)i∈S that is balanced, i.e.,
P
i∈S pi =0 . One should continue to assume that the transfer
density is symmetric around 0: fS(p)=fS(−p). Then, one can replicate the same steps in the
above proof to reach identical conclusions.
4R e l a t e d W o r k
Shapley and Scarf (1974) present basic properties of a special case of discrete allocation problems
we considered, known as the house allocation problem, where each agent is assigned exactly one
object. Uzawa (1962) studies a deterministic barter process for divisible goods, in a setting where
the trading process never gets stuck on ineﬃcient states.
Our work generalizes a result due to Ben-Shoham, Serrano and Volij (2004). In that paper, only
pairwise trade in the house allocation problem without money was considered, and the persistent
shocks are “mistakes” in decision-making.5 In particular, they assume that, when an agent has
5In another paper, Serrano and Volij (2003) explore coalitional trade. Their exchange process is quite diﬀerent
though, because it gives a special role to agents’ initial endowments. This leads to connections with the Walrasian
and core allocations.
14his kth best house, the probability of accepting her mth best house (m>k)h a st h eo r d e ro fεm−k,
where ε ∈ (0,1) is a small number. This is a particular formulation of mistake probabilities where
more serious mistakes are less likely. They show that when the randomness is vanishingly small
(as ε → 0), the allocation that minimizes envy is selected in the long run. Agent i’s envy level is
the number of people who have better houses than agent i (according to i’s preferences). The envy
in the society is the sum of individual agents’ envy levels. The current paper shows that there is a
more general mechanism at work behind this result. First, we note that their speciﬁcation of noise
can be related to the logit model. Let N be the number of houses/agents and let us assume that
agent i’s utility for her kth best house xi is ui(xi)=N −k+1(so that the utilities of the N houses
are 1,2,...,N,w h e r eN is the utility of the best house). A straightforward calculation shows that
we obtain their speciﬁcation of mistake probabilities, when we add the logit noise term to this
utility function. Second, one can see that the envy is equal to
P
i(N − u(xi)), and minimizing
this is equivalent to maximizing the utilitarian social welfare
P
i u(xi). We have found that the
driving force of their result is that the logit noise model maximizes the utilitarian social welfare
(and this is true for any speciﬁcations of utility functions). Furthermore, we are able to derive
the stationary distribution not only when the noise is negligible but also when the randomness is
large. This addresses the concern that it takes a very long time to see the predictions of stochastic
evolutionary models.
Several papers have used logit noise in dynamic adjustment processes (see Durlauf (1997) and
the references therein). The most closely related work to ours is Blume (1997), who obtained a
closed form expression of the stationary distribution for any level of noise when the following three
conditions are satisﬁed:6 (i) players play a potential game (i.e., each player’s best reply function is
the same as in a game in which players have an identical payoﬀ (“potential”)), (ii) at each moment
of time, only one player can adjust, and (iii) all players have an identical precision parameter for





where P is the potential, A is the set of strategy proﬁles, and β is the common precision parameter
measuring the level of utility noise. Young and Burke (2001) present an intriguing application
of Blume’s result to explain the distribution of agricultural contracts in Illinois. Our models are
diﬀerent from Blume’s in that they do not satisfy the above conditions. The technical contribution
of our paper is to show that a similar closed form expression can be obtained for a wider class of
situations where those conditions are not necessarily satisﬁed.
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